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How they made news pay: news traders’ 
quest for crisis-resistant business models 
 
Gerben Bakker1 
 
A shortened and edited version will be forthcoming as: Gerben Bakker, ‘‘Paying for Crisis News: The 
Dilemmas of News Organisations” in: Steve Schifferes and Richard Roberts eds., The Media and 
Financial Crises: Comparative and Historical Perspectives (London, Routledge, September 2014, 
forthcoming). 
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the problem, implied by Arrow’s fundamental paradox of information, 
of how to make money from news. To earn money from important news, news traders need 
to tell the potential buyer what it is, yet once they have revealed it, the buyer no longer 
needs to pay. This paper discusses how historically this paradox made it difficult for news 
agencies to profit from selling important news during crises, and how they gradually 
developed new business models in response. It examines these models and investigates 
how they interacted with market structure, resulting in just a few international news 
agencies dominating the international news supply.  
  
Today just a few news agencies, such as Reuters, the Associated Press and AFP, 
dominate the international supply of raw news.2 They make money from news even 
though it is protected rather imperfectly by intellectual property rights, even though it 
can be endlessly copied, and even though news gets old quickly. Despite these 
challenges, these news agencies have dominated the international news trade since 
                                            
1 Gerben Bakker is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE; Tel.: + 44 - (0) 20 – 7955 7047; Fax: + 44 - (0) 20 – 7955 7730. Website: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts/profile.aspx?KeyValue=g.bakker@lse.ac.uk. 
2 The author would like to thank Paul Auerbach, Richard R. John, Mary Morgan, Oliver Volckart, Peter Putnis, Richard Roberts, 
Steve Schifferes, Peter Scott, Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb and Krim Talia for comments and suggestions, as well as Jeff Hulbert 
and John Hobart for steering the paper through the editorial process. Previous versions benefited from comments received at 
the workshop on the history of the business press, University of Uppsala, at the International Economic History Association 
Conference in Helsinki, at the British Academy of Management Conference in Belfast, and at the Journalism and the Global 
Financial Crisis Symposium, City University, London. The research for this paper was partially funded by the Social and 
Economic Research Council (U.K.) and the Advanced Institute of Management Research under the ESRC/AIM Ghoshal 
Fellowship Scheme, grant number RES-331-25-3012. The author alone, of course, is responsible for the final text and any 
errors of fact or interpretation that may remain. 
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the mid-nineteenth century. They survived the rise of mass-circulation newspapers 
that had their own correspondents, as well as the advent of radio, television and the 
internet. 
 This paper examines how this handful of firms came to dominate the 
international raw news supply, how these agencies have been able to make money 
from raw news, and what business models they developed to this end. We examine 
how these business models interacted with market structure, and how they held their 
ground during crises. 
 These questions are relevant because news agencies are the key link 
between news as it happens and the buyers of raw news, such as the news media, 
financial firms and government departments, and it is worthwhile to know how the 
few organisations that provided the service were able to dominate the market. Since 
crises can have huge impacts on our world, it is important to examine how news 
agencies’ business models worked during crises. 
 To answer these questions we will examine especially the period in which 
these business models emerged, and we will look at theory that can explain how 
news traders operated. We will focus on history and theory to answer these 
questions, and in that way we hope to provide a unique historical contribution to the 
debate about the role of news agencies in our news supply today. We will start with 
reviewing some stylised facts about the very long-run history of news agencies. Then 
we will look at the changes in the structure of the news market during the nineteenth 
century. Then we will discuss the business models that news agencies developed to 
make money from news and from crises, and then we examine how their business 
model held up during crises. Our method is historical, analytic and economic. We 
restrict ourselves here to international news agencies that aim to offer their 
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customers global coverage. We will not deal with the development of the 
technological infrastructure, for which different works can be consulted.3 
 
 
The evolution of news agencies 
This section will briefly outline the evolution of the trade in raw news.4 Since the 
Middle Ages news has been traded in many different ways. Before the sixteenth 
century a major form of news provision was through letters. As a reciprocal custom, 
diplomats and merchants wrote the latest news and prices at the bottom of letters.  
Some news brokers sold hand-copied newsletters to which customers could 
subscribe, and many cities had a news caller who verbally told the latest news for a 
fee.  In the sixteenth century, trading exchanges started to issue newsletters with 
daily price data and sell these to those outside of the exchange. A few large, 
geographically spread-out organisations set up an internal news service. The 
Fuggers of Augsburg, for example, one of the biggest financers of their day, had 
their own messaging service.5 During the seventeenth century, independent news 
services became more prominent, such as Abraham Casteleyn’s regular news 
services, operated from Haarlem in the Netherlands.6 In seventeenth century Britain 
some newsletter writers received fees of £20 per annum from noblemen for regular 
newsletters. At the end of the century annual charges for weekly newsletters varied 
between £3 and £6, as the increase in printed news kept a lid on prices.7 Social 
                                            
3 On the interaction between the development of new communication technologies and news agencies see Gerben Bakker, 
“Trading Facts: Arrow’s Fundamental Paradox and the Origins of Global News Networks” in: Peter Putnis, Chandrika Kaul and 
Juergen Wilke eds., International Communication and Global News Networks: Historical Perspectives (Hampton Press / 
International Association of Media and Communication Research, 2011), pp. 9-54. 
4 For an extensive historical overview see Bakker, “Trading Facts.” 
5 It is still disputed whether the Fuggers’ news service was also meant for outside customers. 
6 J. A. Baggerman and J. M. H. Hemels, Verzorgd door het ANP: Vijftig jaar nieuwsvoorziening (Utrecht and Antwerpen: Veen 
Uitgevers, 1985), p. 16. The liberal climate in Dutch Republic may have been important. The Republic was one of the few 
states allowing the free reporting of domestic news, whereas many other states only allowed foreign news to be reported. 
7 David Zaret, Origins of democratic culture: printing, petitions, and the public sphere in early modern England (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 127. 
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circles might also circulate letters containing news. In France the salons that some 
upper-class people maintained circulated newsletters. In eighteenth century Paris, 
for example, Mrs. M.-A. L. Doublet ran a salon for her friends of the Paris elite, 
where news was gathered, reliability assessed and then copied by hand to be sent 
out to selected friends, who might copy it further. Inhabitants of the provinces were 
happy to pay six livres a month to subscribe to the newsletter.8  
 In the eighteenth and nineteenth century specialised news agencies started to 
emerge. An early one was Lloyd’s of London, which published Lloyd’s list, containing 
ship arrivals and departures for most harbours in the world, ship losses, exchange 
rates, prices and other information. Among subscribers were merchants, insurance 
companies and government departments. In many countries also smaller national 
news agencies emerged, such as Agence Garnier in France. The Dutch newspaper 
the Gazette de Leyde also maintained an international network in the mid-eighteenth 
century. During the nineteenth century the Times of London employed several 
foreign correspondents. In 1837 it set up a pigeon service to get fast stock 
quotations from the continent. 
 During the 1840s and 1850s many of the modern news agencies emerged, 
such as Havas in France, which acquired a number of older news agencies, Reuters 
in Britain, Wolff-Continental in Germany and the New York Associated Press in New 
York. Making use where they could of the new electric telegraph, these agencies set 
up worldwide networks of correspondents and had as their main customers 
newspapers, governments, merchants, banks, insurance companies and other  
                                            
8  Robert Darnton, ‘An Early Information Society: News and the Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris,’ American Historical 
Review, Vol. 105 (2000), pp. 1-35. 
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Diagram 1. Hypothetical production possibility frontier for the quantity of raw news facts produced and 
the quantity of all other goods and services. 
 
businesses. By the 1860s the four main agencies had divided up the world in 
spheres of influence and stopped competing directly with each other. This 
international news cartel would remain in force, in various incarnations, well into the 
twentieth century. 
The production possibility frontier (PPF), developed by Gottfried von Haberler 
in the interwar period, can help to conceptualise the radical change brought about in 
the news trade during the nineteenth century.9 The PPF is a line that reflects all the 
production possibilities in an economy that maximise output  (Diagram 1). If a 
country can produce only hundred tons of butter or hundred tons of guns, then the 
PPF gives all possible maximising combinations. If we picture guns and butter on 
two axes then on one extreme hundred tons of butter are produced and at the other 
extreme hundred tons of guns, and the PPF also shows all maximising combinations 
in between. Many economies, however, will not produce those maximising   
                                            
9 Gottfried Haberler, “The Theory of Comparative Costs and Its Use in the Defense of Free Trade”, Selected Essays (1930), pp. 
3-19. 
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Diagram 2. Qualitative analysis of successive shifts in the production possibility frontier for 
raw news during the nineteenth century. 
   
Exogenous technological change First-order outward shift of PPF 
related to news 
Second-order outward shift of PPF 
related to news 
   
   
Good and cheap telescopes 
Electricity 
Magnetism 
Literacy 
Printing press (15th c. - ) 
Postal pigeons (18th - ) 
Optical telegraph (1790s - ) 
Electric telegraph (1830s - ) 
 
Trading news 
Local news agencies  
International news agencies 
Global news agencies 
 
Note: PPF = Production possibility frontier (see text). 
Sources: see text and Bakker (2011). 
 
combinations, but something suboptional, such as combination A or combination B in 
Diagram 1. 
Dynamic efficiency is a process in which the PPF is being pushed outwards 
continuously. A PPF can show the trade-off of a society in consuming raw news and 
all other products. Inside the frontier C-F, say from A to B, we can get more of both 
goods by using more efficient existing technology. At the frontier, starting from C to 
D, initially we get lots more raw news by giving up a little of all else (e.g. C – Dy 
yields Dx in Diagram 1), but eventually we get less and less additional news for an 
additional amount of other goods we give up (close to point F on the curve, giving up 
a lot of all else yields only a little bit more news).  
Point D is productively efficient as it is on the PPF, but not allocatively 
efficient, as it is not on the highest utility curve possible, unlike point E, which is both. 
The second PPF C-G shows the effect of dynamic efficiency, brought about by 
innovations such as the optical and electric telegraphs.  
During the nineteenth century, several exogenous innovations ranging from 
good and cheap telescopes becoming available to new discoveries about electricity 
and magnetism, shifted the PPF outwards, and entrepreneurs jumped on it by 
building visual and electrical telegraph lines (Diagram 2). This in its turn shifted the 
PPF for news and all other goods further outwards, and the entrepreneurs that 
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founded the modern news agencies in their turn, used these innovations to innovate 
in the trade in news. The demand for their services was also stimulated by 
technological and societal change, such as increasing literacy, the rise of stock 
exchanges, urbanisation, increasing international trade, a larger market and mass-
printing technologies.10 
 
 
The changing market structure of news 
Four tendencies are visible in the evolution of most media industries. These 
tendencies each consist of a basic economic characteristic that has an implication 
for changes over time. Interacting with history, this leads to particular historical 
expressions (Diagram 3).11 In the case of news, sunk costs led to a quality race, 
leading to a handful of news agencies dominating the international news trade after 
the 1850s; the fact that marginal revenues equalled marginal profits stimulated 
vertical integration,12 as for example expressed in the many news cooperatives 
across the world and the Press Association’s acquisition of Reuters; the toll good 
character of news led to business models focused on ways to exclude customers so 
a fee could be asked. And the project-based character of news gathering led often to 
agglomeration and co-location of news traders with other media industries. In this 
section we will focus on sunk costs, marginal revenues equalling marginal costs and   
                                            
10 For a general discussion of these changes in demand see Gerben Bakker, Entertainment Industrialised: The Emergence of 
the International Film Industry, 1890-1940 (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
11 This model for historical analysis of media industries is discussed in more detail in Gerben Bakker, ‘Sunk Costs and the 
Dynamics of Creative Industries’ in Candace Jones, Mark Lorenzen and Jonathan Sapsed eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Creative Industries (Oxford University Press, 2013, forthcoming).. 
12 The importance of the capture of marginal revenues for media organizations is further explored in Gerben Bakker, ‘The 
Making of a Music Multinational: Polygram’s International Businesses, 1945–1998’, Business History Review, 80 (2006), pp. 
81–123, and in Gerben Bakker, ‘Adopting the Rights-Based Model: Music Multinationals and Local Music Industries since 
1945’, Journal of Popular Music History, Vol. 6 No. 3 (2011), pp. 311-349. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (The Free Press, 1985), and John Roberts, The Modern Firm: 
Organizational Design for Performance and Growth (Oxford University Press, 2004) provide theories to explain why activities 
are done within or without an organization. 
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Diagram 3. Major economic characteristics of the news trade and their dynamic and historical 
implications for the business of gathering and selling news. 
   Economic characteristic 
 
Dynamic implication Historical expression 
   Sunk costs Quality race Emergence and rise to 
dominance of a handful of 
agencies during the 1850s 
 
 
 
 
Marginal revenue = marginal 
profits 
Vertical integration 
 
Dual market structure 
News agencies often owned by 
cooperatives of newspapers 
AP; merger of Reuters with the 
Press Association (1919); 
Australian news cooperative; 
Dutch news cooperative 
(1930s) 
 
Toll-good character 
(non-diminishable but 
excludable) 
Business models Focus on sellable economic 
data since 16th century 
Subscription models 
Copyright (since late 19th 
century) 
 
 
Project-based character Agglomeration Most news agencies in 
metropolises, co-located with 
customers, other news 
companies and other media 
industries. 
 
 
Source: based on the framework introduced in Gerben Bakker, ‘Sunk Costs and the Dynamics of the Creative Industries: A 
Very Long-Run Perspective’, in Candace Jones, Mark Lorenzen, and Jonathan Sapsed (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Creative 
Industries (Oxford University Press, 2014, forthcoming). 
 
the project-based character of the news business. The toll good character will be 
discussed in the next section. 
During the nineteenth century, the market for news grew enormously. 
Demand increased because of growing literacy, growing political debate concomitant 
with newly won parliamentary representation, and rapid population and income 
growth. On the supply side, new ways of mass-printing reduced the average cost of 
a newspaper copy, and the visual and electrical telegraphs enabled more rapid news 
delivery. Because these new technology also diminished response times of persons 
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involved in the news, the news cycles probably shortened and the intensity of  the 
news likely increased. 
Given that many costs of news traders were fixed and sunk and did not 
increase proportionally to the number of messages once their network is complete, a 
larger market led to higher profits. As the news market grew rapidly, more news 
traders should enter the business, attracted by the larger potential profits, and 
industrial concentration, the market share of the largest firms, should decrease. 
What we see in practice, however, is that from the 1850s just a few large 
organisations come to dominate the international trade of raw news, and that few 
new firms successfully challenged these incumbents. 
This is a puzzle, and while the answer to it will lie in the confluence of several 
different factors, we will first focus here on the underlying economic mechanism, that 
is related to the nature of costs in news broking and the cost and benefits from 
quality and capability increases. 
A substantial amount of the costs of international news agencies were fixed 
and/or sunk. Fixed costs are costs that do not increase with output over the period 
examined, and sunk costs are costs that are incurred once, that must be incurred to 
enter in the business and cannot be recovered when a firm exits the business. It is 
clear that for a news agency many costs were fixed, such as the salaries of 
correspondents, leased telegraph lines, rents for offices, maintaining a pigeon 
service. Variable costs included free-lance correspondents paid per word or news 
item, the ad-hoc lease of telegraph wires, and telegraphing messages for a per-word 
fee. One could also argue that some of these costs were sunk: the costs involved in 
setting up the network of correspondents, in building a client list and in establishing a 
reputation for reliable news. 
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Given the large share of fixed and sunk costs, an increase in the size of the 
market means that the revenues of a news agency will increase, but that the costs 
will not increase proportionally, so that profits for the existing level of quality will have 
increased. Now, two things can happen in such a situation: attracted by the greater 
profits, new entrants may enter the raw news market, or existing firms may spend 
more on their fixed and sunk costs to increase quality, as the reward for quality has 
now become higher. Which of the two effects has the upper hand depends on the 
pattern of technology and tastes: ‘technology’ determines how expensive it is to 
increase quality, and tastes determine the reward that the buyers in the market are 
given for better quality.13 
It is likely that the second effect dominated in the raw news market during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. It was relatively easy to increase quality, 
which meant that it was profitable for the incumbents to spend a lot of money to do 
this. In raw news provision, ways to increase quality and capabilities included a) the 
increase of network coverage, of the number of locations in the world from which 
news was gathered, b) to increase reliability and reputation by investing in fact-
checking, by hiring the best and fastest talent (correspondents and reporters in this 
case) c) the increase in the variety of news items offered, such as politics, business, 
sports, arts, science and human interest bundles, and d) offering additional services 
such as photographs, advertising and financial services. 
On the demand side, the reward for better quality was high. Many 
businesspeople would profit from getting information slightly earlier than rivals, and 
newspapers were willing to pay a lot of money to get news earlier than rivals, or at 
                                            
13 On sunk costs see John Sutton, Technology and market structure: Theory and history (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998); for 
a discussion of the relevance of sunk costs for the history of media industries see Gerben Bakker, “The Decline and Fall of the 
European film industry: Sunk costs, market size and market structure, 1890–1927,” Economic History Review, vol. 58 (2005), 
pp. 310–51; 317–22; for a historical discussion of the problem of financing sunk costs see Gerben Bakker, ‘Money for Nothing: 
How Firms Have Financed R&D-Projects since the Industrial Revolution’, Research Policy, Vol. 42 (Dec. 2013), pp. 1793-1814. 
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least to have a guarantee not to get it later. The New York Herald, for example, 
offered $500 for every hour that it received important European news earlier than its 
rivals. A lot of the premium centred on speed and accuracy. With faster news cycles, 
the premium on this may have increased. Even nowadays financial news services 
such as those run by Dow Jones, can ask premium subscription fees from 
subscribing firms because they generally can deliver important business news a few 
seconds earlier than many other services. For smaller newspapers, subscription to a 
news agency with a large network coverage and bundles including specialised items 
were probably important, as they allowed them to do without many specialised  
reporters or correspondents. Also, the spread of international investments and of 
empires during the late nineteenth century may have increased the demand for 
international news. The emergence and growth of stock exchanges during the 
nineteenth century probably had a similar effect. More generally, the enormous 
growth in newspaper circulation during the nineteenth century increased the demand 
for news and the willingness of newspapers to pay for high-quality raw news. 
On the supply side, it became relatively easy to increase quality because the 
electric telegraph lines made it easier to add correspondents to an existing network, 
and they increased the speed of communication. The increasing capacity of 
telegraph lines during the late nineteenth century, when capacity per wire increased 
several times by using new ‘multiplex’ and other technology, made is easier to offer 
bundles of specialised news as well. Also, as noted above, the news feedback cycle 
intensified, meaning there was more news to report per time period, while news 
agencies’ fixed costs did not increase proportionally. More trained professional 
journalists became available, making hiring easier, and photography became 
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available, and during the early twentieth century telegraph transmission of 
photographs became possible. 
Since it became easier to increase quality and because at the same time the 
reward for better quality increased, paradoxically it became profitable for 
entrepreneurs and especially the larger incumbent firms to spend far more on 
increasing quality, as the costs became lower and the rewards higher, and so they 
were easily willing to outspend rivals. This explanation could explain why we see an 
enormous increase in the market for raw news since the nineteenth century, yet no 
decrease in industrial concentration. In national news markets, in many countries we 
see the same trend: a sharply increasing market for raw news and just a few national 
news agencies, sometimes only one. 
Although the economic explanation above is a likely one, given the nature of 
history and of the historical evidence, it is impossible to prove that this was the one 
and only explanation for what happened. It is clear that several other factors were 
important as well. First, access to telegraph wires was scarce and costly, especially 
initially, with a single or just a few providers, and sometimes required a lot of 
lobbying to obtain. Second, from the start, governments were very much involved 
with their national news agencies, and may have limited the possibilities of new 
international entrants. The German government even provided financial support for 
Wolff-Continental, and a century earlier the British Admiralty had relied heavily on 
Lloyds List and Lloyd’s news services in times of war. Third, the international news 
cartel limited entry and kept industrial concentration high–yet one could argue that if 
the economic fundamentals of news provision had been different then it would have 
been far more difficult to maintain the cartel. Fourth, in national news markets 
national news agencies were often vertically integrated with newspapers in an 
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exclusive cooperative arrangement, thus making it difficult for new entrants to find 
customers. 
The situation brought about by the quality race and other factors discussed 
above resembled a dual market structure often seen in markets were marginal costs 
are extremely low: a few large firms dominated the international market and national 
markets, complemented by a fringe of smaller organisations such as regional news 
agencies, specialised news agencies such as Lloyd’s List, and networks of 
correspondents of newspapers. The dual market structure resulted from the 
economic characteristic that given that a large part of costs were fixed and sunk and 
reproduction costs were low, marginal revenues to a large extent equalled marginal 
profits (Diagram 3). This characteristic stimulated vertical integration, because with 
vertical integration, the producer had an incentive to incur more sunk costs as long 
as they led to more marginal revenues. With outright selling, it would be mainly the 
final seller or retailed who captured the marginal revenues and the producer 
therefore might not be willing to incur higher sunk costs. The Associated Press, for 
example, was willing to sink large amounts in its reporting, because its owners, the 
newspapers, would earn the marginal revenues that these additional outlays 
generated.  
Another economic characteristic, the project-based character of news 
gathering led often to agglomeration and co-location of news traders with other 
media industries. Reuters, Wolff-Continental, Havas, Associated Press were all 
obviously located in big media districts in their respective countries, close to their 
customers, to competitors, to news suppliers and to other media industries (Diagram 
3).  
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In terms of timing we see from the 1830s an increasing use of the visual 
telegraph and postal pigeons, from the 1840s the use of the electric telegraph, and a 
sharp increase in the raw news market throughout the entire nineteenth century. 
From at least the 1860s the market for international news was highly concentrated. 
 
 
Business models: the fundamental paradox of information 
The development discussed above, with news agencies incurring outlays to increase 
quality and customers willing to pay a premium for a higher quality of raw news 
provision, could only happen because news agencies were able to ask money for 
their services; they could set a price for it and be paid for it. Though for many 
industries this may seem self-evident, for news provision it was not. 
As the news agencies developed, they had to devise new ways of organizing 
and transacting to make the gathering and distribution of news profitable. The major 
challenge they faced was being able to trade information for money. According to the 
“fundamental paradox in the determination of demand for information,” put forward 
by the economist and Nobel laureate Kenneth J. Arrow, buyers cannot assess how 
much they would want to pay for information without knowing its content, but once 
they know its content, they no longer need to pay: “its value for the purchaser is not 
known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without 
cost.”14 This made selling news piece by piece rather problematic. 
The diplomats and merchants of the Renaissance, who noted the latest news 
at the bottom of their letters, and later the exchanging newspapers in the United 
States and elsewhere used reciprocity as a mechanism to make the marginal price  
                                            
14 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in: Richard Nelson ed., The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity (Princeton, NJ: NBER / Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 609-626; 615. 
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Diagram 4. Measurable Properties of Economic, Political, and Social Qualities.  
    
Quality Measurable Property Typical Range of  
Numerical Values 
 
Typical Sources 
    
Scarcity Price 〈0, 〉 Price currents 
    
 Quantity [0, 〉 Imports/exports 
(bills of entry) 
    
Terms of trade 
 
Exchange rate 〈0, 〉 Price currents 
    
Reputation Credit rating {0, 1} Letters; reports of 
credit agencies 
    
Existence of a ship 
 
Arrival in a harbour {0, 1, ∅} Lloyd’s List 
    
Scarcity of the future 
 
Interest rate 〈0, 〉 Price currents 
    
Scarcity of a firm’s total 
assets 
Share price 〈0, 〉 Price currents; 
newspapers 
    
 
 
   
Change of executive and/or 
legislative branch of the 
state  
Outcome of the election; 
detailed election results 
{0, 1}; 
[0, n] 
Newswires; 
newspapers 
        
Performance of armies in 
known military battle 
Outcome of the battle; 
losses/casualties 
{0, 1}; 
[0,〉 
Newswires; 
newspapers 
        
Contestants’ performance in 
sports match  
Sports match outcome;  
contestants’ score 
{0, 1} ; 
[0, 〉 
Newswires; 
newspapers 
        
Prevailing opinion in a 
population 
 
Responses to survey [0, 100] Newswires; 
newspapers 
 
Note: numerical values are expressed in standard mathematical domain ranges, where, for example, a square bracket includes 
a value, whereas a diagonal bracket excludes it. For example, 〈0, 〉 implies that the numerical values are above zero, {0, 1} 
that a battle has been lost (0) or won (1) and {0, 1, ∅} implies that a ship can be listed as lost (0), can be listed as arrived (1), or 
is not listed (∅). [0, n] refers to a definite range, where n depends on the size of the respective legislature. 
Source: See the section “Evolution of news agencies” and its sources; Gerben Bakker, ‘Trading Facts: Arrow’s Fundamental 
Paradox and the Origins of Global News Networks’, in Peter Putnis, Chandrika Kaul, and Jürgen Wilke (eds.) International 
Communication and Global News Networks: Historical Perspectives (Hampton Press / International Association of Media and 
Communication Research, 2011), pp. 9–54..  
 
of the news zero, even though the marginal cost to the news supplier might have 
been higher than zero. 15 
                                            
15 See the previous section. 
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The early modern news traders suffered less from Arrow’s paradox when they 
supplied trade information that consisted of the numerical value of a measurable 
property of an economic quality. Six main categories of values were traded (Diagram 
4). First, a price was a measurable property of the economic quality “scarcity” and 
was abundantly traded in letters and through price currents. Imported and exported 
quantities at specific ports, as tabulated in bills of entry, formed another measurable 
property of scarcity.16 Second, exchange rates formed a measurable property of the 
general terms of trade between two areas. A third important category, which was 
more often dealt with in private correspondence and internal news services, such as 
that of the Fuggers, was the reputation of clients or trading partners.17 The quality 
“reputation” had the measurable property “credit rating,” which in theory could be 
“creditworthy” or “not creditworthy,” or some steps on an ordinal scale in between. 
Money could be asked for by simply mentioning the quality (reputation or 
creditworthiness) and supplying qualitative information from which the buyer could 
distil a judgement, or, as would happen during the nineteenth century, a numerical 
value itself (the credit rating) could be sold.18 Morse would later mention inquiries 
about creditworthiness as an important potential application of the telegraph.19  
A fourth category was formed by ship arrivals in harbours, such as that 
supplied in Lloyd’s List, a measurable property of the quality “existence of a ship,” 
                                            
16 See, for example, John J. McCusker, ‘The Business Press in England Before 1775’, in: Essays in the Economic History of the 
Atlantic World (Routledge, 1997), pp. 149–67. 
17 On the importance of reputation, see for example, Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “The role of 
institutions in the revival of trade: The law merchant, private judges and the Champagne fairs,” Economics and Politics, vol. 2 
(1990), pp. 1–23. 
18 Information on a trading partner’s reputation (such as for payment, respect of deadlines, and fidelity to the terms and objects 
of the contract) remained important business information throughout history. Alessandro Stanziani, “Economic information on 
international markets: French strategies in the Italian mirror,” Enterprise & Society, vol. 11 (2010), pp. 26–64, for example, 
shows the importance of this information for French and Italian merchants between 1870 and 1914, and how Italian wine 
exporters had an advantage over their French competitors as the Italian government provided them with detailed information on 
the reputation of foreign trading partners. On credit rating agencies in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth 
century see Martin Ruef and Kelly Patterson, “Credit and Classification: The impact of industry boundaries in nineteenth-
century America,” Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 54 (2009), pp. 486–520. 
19 Menahem Blondheim, News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in America (Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
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which was useful for insurers, large trading companies, and navies.20 Later, share 
prices and interest rates would become two important new categories, measurable 
properties of the scarcity of a firm’s total (tangible and intangible) assets and of the 
scarcity of the future, respectively. For each of these six economic qualities, the 
seller could advertise its measurable property, and was able to only reveal its 
numerical value after having been paid, thus resolving Arrow’s paradox. It was still 
impossible to ask premiums for unexpected changes in numerical values, such as 
price implosions, exchange rate collapses, or the loss of an entire merchant convoy, 
such as the capture of the Spanish silver fleet by the Dutch Republic.21  
Business news could be sold because the seller could inform the buyer what 
particular economic quality the information would be about, and what measurable 
property of it was contained in it, without revealing the actual numerical value. In 
theory, general news also could be sold in this way, but by saying that one had 
information about a political upheaval in Spain or about events affecting future grain 
prices one already had revealed important information: that something had 
happened in Spain, that it was political, and that it was important, or that something 
had happened that would affect grain prices. Yet one had not revealed enough about 
the information’s reliability and detailed content for the buyer to establish what he 
was willing to pay. 
Some general news did have measurable properties that could be specified in 
advance without revealing their numerical value. The main such categories were 
election results, sports results and, to a lesser extent, the outcome of known military 
                                            
20 For credit rating and ship arrivals, the information was binary (creditworthy or not creditworthy, ships on the list of the 
information buyer have arrived or not). 
21 See the discussion of early news services in the preceding section. Nevertheless, the early newspapers of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were typically sold by subscription payable in advance, suggesting Arrow’s paradox may have been an 
issue in selling them. Subscriptions and lower printing costs made the capital outlays needed for early newspapers smaller than 
for books. Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications (New York, Basic Books, 2004), 
p. 32. 
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battles (Diagram 4). Contrary to the economic categories, these three categories 
involved irreversible win-or-lose outcomes, although the intermediate election 
results, losses, or match scores could be reported in instalments. As a rule of thumb, 
any information on which one could place a definite bet, and for which thus in theory 
a futures market was possible, was at least partially tradable and suffered less from 
Arrow’s paradox: The buyer knew on which economic quality information was 
needed and the number of measurable properties was a closed set, usually 
containing just a single property, with each property having a defined range 
(Diagram 4). Other news was largely unexpected in quality, almost by its nature, as 
that was its main selling point. The emergence of opinion polls can probably be 
explained by the desire of polling firms to first create measurable properties for some 
news events and then sell their numerical values. Polls also resulted in more 
frequent instalment reporting for events such as elections, as each poll could be read 
as an intermediate election result. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, the emerging international news 
agencies introduced their own two “solutions” to Arrow’s paradox. First, they used 
subscriptions, by which customers paid an advance fee for all the news reports. The 
price was based on the agency’s past reputation in delivering reports and the 
guarantee that the subscriber received all the news the agency gathered, and often 
also was based on the subscriber’s ability to pay, which could be approximated by 
factors such as circulation, prices or estimated profit margins. In the United States, 
for example, newspapers generally paid according to a complex formula, and in 
Britain provincial newspapers paid far lower fees than the London papers.22 When 
                                            
22 This price discrimination was important because of the high fixed costs. Some users had a high willingness to pay, others 
not. With one (intermediate) price total revenue might not be enough to cover fixed costs and the service would not be 
provided, even though aggregate willingness to pay (the consumer surplus) could be enough for the firm to cover fixed costs. 
By charging different subscription fees to different users the firm was able to transform more of the consumer surplus into 
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subscribers had to decide whether it was worth renewing, they only had to think of 
the value of the few news items that had made a difference in their business, and 
these items probably differed from subscriber to subscriber. The subscription system 
made the marginal price of a news item to the customer equal to zero, and thus 
solved Arrow’s paradox.23  
Second, agencies bundled news in packages containing boring and exciting, 
relevant and irrelevant news that could differ from customer to customer. This 
admixture was mainly a characteristic of subscriptions, but sometimes also was 
achieved in other ways. A specific historical circumstance that allowed bundling, for 
example, was the arrival of scheduled mail steamers, such as those from Europe in 
the United States. Entrepreneurs such as Daniel Craig sold the news arriving from 
Europe first to New York merchants and then to the newspapers.24 Knowing that 
they would be first to have the latest European information was enough for buyers to 
pay. The content did not have to be revealed before payment was agreed. Also, part 
of this news consisted of the numerical values of measurable properties of economic 
qualities that merchants knew they could use whatever its content would turn out to 
be. Expected new developments of existing stories probably formed a somewhat 
similar category. Undoubtedly, entirely unexpected news was the most valuable, but 
could not be sold separately. With the laying of permanent transatlantic cables in the 
1860s, European news started to come in piecemeal in small, continuously arriving 
chunks. The opportunity to sell prime European news in a bundle disappeared.25 A 
                                                                                                                                       
revenue and so could incur the high fixed costs. This standard industrial economics finding is discussed with respect to media 
industries in Bakker, ‘Sunk Costs’. 
23 It may, however, not be optimal in efficiency terms, as the price signal can not be used to reach the most efficient allocation, 
and because of this absence of the price signal for individual news items users have to “overconsume” information to find the 
information that is most valuable for them. The present-day “information overload” may be illustrative of this suboptimal 
allocation mechanism. Another solution to Arrow’s fundamental paradox is to make the marginal price zero by bundling it with 
sponsored messages, which is often used in end (consumer) markets (e.g., television advertising). 
24 For a detailed account of the races to get this information first and how and to whom it was sold see Blondheim, News. 
25 On a more general level the heading ‘foreign news’ could be used to sell news in a bundle, as the term made a promise 
about a bundle of news items without revealing their content. It may be no coincidence that in many early European 
newspapers foreign news predominated. See, for example, Starr, Creation, p. 32. Where the foreign news entered by ship at 
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similar case of ‘natural’ packaging was Reuters’ exclusive first-use contract with 
Austrian Lloyd’s for news and market information arriving at Trieste by ship from the 
East, starting in 1852.26 
A third, regulatory, solution to Arrow’s paradox was the use of copyright to 
protect news. Reuters campaigned for a copyright in news throughout the British 
Empire, but only found success in South Africa, while the Associated Press lobbied 
for news copyright in the United States, obtaining a quasi-property right in news in 
1918.27 The degree to which copyright laws could create and protect intellectual 
property rights in news differed from country to country. A detailed study on copyright 
in news telegrams in Australia between 1869 and 1912, for example, shows that the 
balance between the interest in strong property rights and that in the free flow of 
news weighed more heavily toward the former in Australia and toward the latter in 
Britain. An important reason for this was that laws in several British colonies 
specifically protected copyrights in news telegrams.28 In the United States, courts did 
not find quasi-property rights in “hot” news before the 1910s and copyright does not 
appear to have been a major issue before this time. 
Fourth, ancillary services or revenue streams that exploited the news 
agencies’ assets, brand name, or reputation could be used to “cross-subsidize” the 
supply of news. Havas and Reuters, for example, introduced advertising services, 
whereas Wolff-Continental received financial support from the German government. 
In the 1890s, Reuters even started to offer a range of business and financial 
                                                                                                                                       
distinctive intervals, such as the post ships between Amsterdam and London and the steamers between Europe and the United 
States, it arrived already bundled, and newstraders could more easily control its supply. 
26 Donald Read, The Power of News: The History of Reuters, 1849-–1989 (Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 14. 
27 Jonathan Silberstein-Loeb, “The Structure of the News Market in Britain, 1870–1914,” Business History Review 83 (Winter 
2009), pp. 759–88. The Supreme Court ruled that information contained in news was not was not copyrightable but that the 
Associated Press had a quasi-property right in “hot” news. See, for example, Richard Epstein, “International News Service v 
Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News,” Virginia Law Review, vol. 78 (1992), pp. 85–128. 
28 Peter Putnis, “The Struggle over Copyright in News Telegrams in Australia, 1869–1912,” in: Sybil Nolan ed., When 
Journalism Meets History (Melbourne, RMIT Publishing, 2003). 
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services, such as private telegrams, wire remittances, and eventually a bank.29 
Although meant to cushion fluctuations in news revenue, the bank eventually brought 
Reuters to the brink of bankruptcy.30 
Arrow’s fundamental paradox also might explain why recipients of postal 
letters and telegrams often did not pay a price for receiving each individual item. 
They would only want to pay if they would know what the message was or from 
whom it came, and if they did know, they often would no longer need to pay; thus the 
marginal price of receiving was often, but not always, set at zero.31 
 The list of business models discussed above (see Diagram 5 for an overview) 
is not exhaustive. Other models were used as well. In France during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, for example, it was customary for companies, and for 
domestic and foreign governments to pay newspapers for editorial coverage. This 
usually happened through various successive intermediaries. Often a firm paid an 
investment bank which paid another intermediary to pay the newspaper.32 The 
practice did lead to some scandals, such as the campaign to sell shares in a 
company to invest in the building of a Panama canal in the 1880s. At the time many 
commentators claimed that the payments resulted in serious media bias. Yet 
present-day research suggests, surprisingly, that little bias in reporting can be 
observed, despite the widespread payments.33  
                                            
29 Silberstein-Loeb, “News Market,” p. 777. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Exceptions are ‘collect calls’ in which the receiver agrees to pay on hearing who is calling. Historically, several postal 
systems also had a model by which the recipient of the letter would pay, such as the US Post Office Department before 1855, 
when customers collected their letters at the post office: ‘frequent correspondents often found themselves paying large sums 
for letters that they would never have bothered with had they known their contents in advance’. Richard R. John, Spreading the 
News: The American postal system from Franklin to Morse (Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 160–1. 
32 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, panics and crashes: a history of financial crises (Sixth Edition, 
PalgraveMacMillan 2011), 145-6; Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, Les banques Européennes et l’industrialisation internationale dans la 
première moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 632-3. 
33 Vincent Bignon and Antonio Miscio, “Media bias in financial newspapers: evidence from early twentieth century France,” 
European Review of Economic History, Vol. 14 No. 3 (December 2010), pp. 383 432. See also Vincent Bignon and Marc 
Flandreau, “The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War 
I”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 71 (2011), pp. 616-653. 
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Diagram 5. Stylised overview of business models used by raw news traders and news agencies in 
Europe since the Renaissance. 
     
Period Business model Point of exclusion Example cases Effect 
     
     
Since early  
Middle Ages  
Reciprocity Tit-for-tat; 
withholding of 
reciprocal news 
News summary 
written under 
diplomatic letters 
Effective 
     
Since early  
Middle Ages 
Bundling Entire bundle or 
nothing 
News summary 
under merchant’s 
letters 
Effective 
     
Since early  
Middle Ages 
Speed Lateness / 
perishability 
 
Horse couriers  Effective 
     
16th c. – Selling value 
measurements 
Revelation of 
actual 
measurement 
Amsterdam, 
Antwerp and 
Italian exchange 
price currents 
Effective 
     
16th c. –  Subscription Entire annual 
output or nothing 
Italian avvisi; A. 
Casteleyn, 
Netherlands  
Effective 
     
19th c. –  Payments for 
news coverage 
Access to editorial 
content 
French 
newspapers; 
Wolff-Continental 
Limited 
     
19th c. – Owner pays for 
using medium for 
own benefit 
Ownership of 
medium 
French 
newspapers; 
Wolff-Continental 
Limited 
     
1840s –  Vertical 
integration with 
customer group 
Membership / 
ownership of 
news agency 
AP cooperative; 
Reuters merger 
with Press Ass. 
Effective 
     
1850s – 
 
 
Entry deterrence / 
first mover 
advantage 
Sunk committed 
capacity  
Reuters, Havas, 
Wolff-Continental 
Effective 
     
1860s – 1930s Exclusive 
territorial 
contracts 
News stream of 
entire territory / 
nation state 
The international 
news cartel 
Effective 
     
Late 19th c. – Copyright 
 
 
Legal protection Reuters’ 
campaign; South 
Africa; Australia 
Limited 
     
Late 19th c. – Ancillary services 
 
 
Access to other 
services 
Reuters’ adver- 
tising business  
& fin. services; 
Bloomberg 
Limited 
 
Notes: ‘16th c. --’ means since the sixteenth century, and so forth. ‘News stream of entire territory / nation state’ means all the 
news originating in the territory and gathered by the relevant news agency. Havas, could, for example, withhold all the news 
from France and refuse to sell it to Reuters, for example, or the Austrialan Press Association, a news cooperative, could 
withhold all the news coming from Australia through their organisation from a foreign contracting partner such as Reuters. 
‘Since early Middle Ages’ means at least since those times. Obviously it is likely that those models were used even earlier. 
Sources: See text. 
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Another business model used widely in France by the customers of the news 
agencies, especially during the interwar period, was the buying of newspapers to 
influence the political and business climate to the advantage of the new owner, and 
therefore accepting lower commercial returns. Over time, as the quality of 
information declined, those newspapers would decline and sometimes disappear, 
but the cartel in the French newspaper market which hampered new entrants meant 
that these periods could be very long.34 The major news agencies may not have 
been entirely immune to this business model. As noted above, Wolff-Continental, for 
example, received payments from the German government in the nineteenth 
century.  
 
 
Business models: news as a toll good  
In addition to the fundamental paradox, the news agencies faced a second, and 
related challenge—news was a quasi-public good. This economic characteristic 
formed the origin of the third economic tendency that affected the evolution of media 
industries: they made products that were nonrivalrous but excludable (Diagram 3). A 
product is nonrivalrous, sometimes also called nondiminishable, if one person 
consuming the good does not take away the quantity available to another person. 
One additional person ‘consuming’ national defence, for example, does not decrease 
the quantity available to others, while one additional person consuming bread does 
so. Pure public goods, such as national defence, are both nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable and pure private goods, such as bread, are both rivalrous and 
excludable. In practice, rivalrousness and excludability are often a matter of degree, 
                                            
34 Vincent Bignon and Marc Flandreau, “The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France,” 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper, No. 09 (Geneva, 2012). 
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and quasi-public goods can be further divided into non-excludable but rivalrous 
goods, called common pool resources, such as fishing grounds or natural water 
systems, and non-rivalrous but excludable goods, called toll goods, such as private 
clubs, day-care centres or theatres.35 
Some technical inputs to the media industry, such as broadcasting spectra, 
could be characterised as common pool resources, but most media outputs were toll 
goods. Until a cinema was filled to capacity, for example, one person watching a 
movie did not prevent another person watching the same movie, and one person 
subscribing to a cable channel did not diminish the subscription opportunity to other 
consumers. This non-rivalrousness, combined with the possibility to exclude 
consumers, led to the adoption of business models that focused on the point of 
exclusion. Theatres, for example, could prohibit entry and thus charge ticket prices, 
printed and recorded media could sell physical products protected by copyright, and 
the early broadcasters could exclude advertisers from the airwaves and thus get 
their revenue from them. Stars also were able to extract rents, with superstars 
earning very high fees.36 
Likewise, one additional customer receiving a news bulletin did not reduce the 
quantity of news available to others. Only the medium was diminishable, but news 
could spread through many different media.37 Yet news was not entirely 
nonexcludable. News gatherers could keep news secret or use distribution 
technology to vary the time at which various customers obtained access to news. For 
example, news on a planned merger might be confined to the negotiators, the public 
                                            
35 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems,” American 
Economic Review 100 (2010), pp. 641-672. 
36 Gerben Bakker, “Stars and Stories: How Films Became Branded Products,” Enterprise and Society, Vol. 2 No. 3 (September 
2001), 461-502. 
37 Arrow, “Economic Welfare,” also notes that information is indivisible: Just a small piece of it does not have a proportionate 
value; it often has no value at all. 
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being excluded until an announcement was made.38 The emerging news agencies 
therefore adopted business models that focused on the point of exclusion (Diagram 
5).  
The toll good character posed two major business challenges to news 
agencies, one related to non-excludability the other to nonrivalrousness. The 
problem of imperfect excludability implied that in theory, a subscriber could resell or 
share the news with other organizations. Also, nonsubscribers to news agencies 
could simply take the news from subscribers’ newspapers. Several solutions existed. 
First, contracts could prohibit such redistribution. Second, news could be sold in bulk 
to associations of customers such as newspapers. A third solution was that, after 
some time, news would become old and lose its value, and timeliness was thus a 
news agency’s essential selling point. Fourth, on an international level, agencies 
could make exclusive agreements for entire territories, leaving the contract partner to 
organize exclusion at the national level (Diagram 5). The agencies achieved this by 
first agreeing on an international cartel, and then making long-term contracts with 
national monopolies within each agency’s exclusive area. 
From the 1850s to the 1930s, Reuters, Havas, and Wolff-Continental, with the 
acquiescence from the New York Associated Press (NYAP)  and later the 
Associated Press as well as several smaller players, operated an international cartel, 
in which they divided the world into areas where each had exclusivity for news 
gathering. 39 These areas generally coincided with colonial and cultural spheres of 
influence, with competition sometimes maintained in areas that did not fall clearly 
                                            
38 A detailed historical case study examining how the Associated Press, a non-profit cooperative owned by U.S. newspapers, 
developed a business model solving the quasi-public good characteristics of news is Stephen Shmanske, “News as a Public 
Good: Cooperative Ownership, Price Commitments, and the Success of the Associated Press,” Business History Review, vol. 
60 (1986), pp. 55-80. 
39 Jacques Wolff, ‘Structure, fonctionnement et évolution du marché international des nouvelles: Les agences de presse de 
1835 à 1934’, Revue Économique, 42 (1991), pp. 575-601; Terhi Rantanen, ‘Foreign Dependence and Domestic Monopoly: 
The European News Cartel and U.S. Associated Presses, 1861–1932’, Media History, 12 (2006), pp. 19-35. In the nineteenth 
century Wolff-Continental was less fully developed and relied more on individual foreign correspondents than the other 
agencies. 
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within such a sphere.40 The agencies saved substantial costs by obtaining the news 
from each other in these areas rather than building a duplicate organization. The first 
agreement dated from 1856 and concerned the exchange of stock market and other 
business data between Havas and Reuters.41 
Often the international agencies had exchange agreements with national 
counterparts, which made them the sole supplier of news to and from an area. An 
example of the difficulty of maintaining such arrangements is the history of contracts 
between Reuters and the Australian newspapers. The “ideal,” from Reuters’ 
perspective, was for Australian newspapers to form their own cooperative news-
gathering organization that would have a virtual monopoly on news collection for 
overseas sale. Such an organization would make an exclusive agreement with 
Reuters, in which it would only sell its news to Reuters, and Reuters would buy 
Australian news exclusively from this cooperative. In practice, rivalries within the 
Australian press made it difficult to maintain this level of cooperation despite the 
potential cost savings and increased revenue involved.42 
 
 
Business models: news as a nonrivalrous good 
Although the nonexcludability problem was mainly related to customers, the 
nonrivalrousness problem involved competitors. News had high fixed and sunk costs 
and low marginal costs meaning that the latter kept decreasing continuously, even if 
                                            
40 The agreements did not stop the agencies competing in areas outside the agreement. From the 1860s to the 1890s, for 
example, Reuters was still providing a competing service to Wolff-Continental in some German cities, using an alternative cable 
and telegraph line. Terhi Rantanen, When news was new (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 97–99. 
41 Read, Reuters. 
42 For a detailed historical discussion see Terhi Rantanen, “The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Markets (1),” in: Boyd-
Barrett and Rantanen, The globalization of news; Peter Putnis, “Reuters in Australia: The Supply and Exchange of News, 
1859–1877,” Media History, vol. 10 (2004), pp. 67–88; —, “How the international news agency business model failed: Reuters 
in Australia, 1877–1895,” Media History, vol. 12 (2006), pp. 1–17. Shmanske, “News as a Public Good,” discusses how the 
cooperative structure of the Associated Press in the United States lowered the cost of exclusion. He also argues that 
cooperative rules where a commitment mechanism that prevented the Associated Press from matching discounts that any rival 
might offer; in the short run this might mean foregoing profits, in the long run this meant that members would not haggle about 
the price because they knew the Associated Press could not lower the price. 
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a firm’s output equalled the entire market demand. In a competitive situation where 
prices equalled marginal costs, prices would be zero and either no firm would enter 
and build a news organization, or already existing organizations would go bankrupt, 
never to recoup their sunk costs. News agencies had considerable fixed costs, 
including local offices and correspondents, leases of lines. and head office costs.43 
For the Western Associated Press, the cost of telegraph transmission, paid to 
Western Union, was about 60 percent of all costs in the 1870s and early 1880s, after 
that shooting up to 70 percent and more.44 For its successor, the Associated Press, 
the costs of leasing or using telegraph lines fluctuated between 48 and 68 percent of 
all costs between 1893 and 1913, the cost being firmly above 60 percent from 1906 
onward. 
The solution to the nondiminishability problem was twofold. First, there was a 
market solution because first mover effects existed. The marginal costs of news 
distribution were so low that adding a subscriber cost hardly anything. An increase in 
subscribers thus reduced average costs indefinitely, as fixed costs were spread over 
more subscribers. Once an agency had built a reputable news service and a large 
subscriber base, it could deter any new entrant by pricing at marginal cost because it 
had already incurred its sunk outlays, whereas the entrant could still decide not to 
sink money.45 This explained why, after the telegraph, relatively few news agencies 
dominated national and international markets. 
                                            
43 Fixed costs are costs associated with inputs that cannot be varied. The organization must pay these costs regardless of the 
output level, even if output would be zero. The extent to which this is the case depends on the length of the period studied. 
Short-run fixed costs are costs that can be avoided in the longer run (such as salary costs for employment contracts with three 
months notice), long-run fixed costs can not be avoided in the longer-run (say a five-year lease contract for a telegraph line). 
Naturally, a fixed-cost category such as “leased wires” may consist of a bundle of contracts with varying length and of “spot” 
rentals, explaining the fluctuations in Fig. 1.1. Even so, this category as a whole fluctuated far less than the other categories 
and is consistently monotonically increasing in real dollar terms (not percentage of costs), except for the war years. 
44 Richard Allen Schwarzlose, The American Wire Services: A Study of Their Development as a Social Institution (University of 
Illinois PhD, 1965, reprinted by Arno Press, 1979), p. 251. 
45 On sunk costs see Sutton, Technology and Market Structure; for a discussion of the relevance of sunk costs for the history of 
media industries see akker, “Decline and Fall”; for a historical discussion of the problem of financing sunk costs see Bakker, 
“Money for Nothing.” 
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A second solution was organizational. Given that the initial large news 
agencies already existed, already had incurred their sunk costs, and would not exit 
the market any more, they learned to live with each other and formed a cartel, 
preventing competition that would bring prices down to marginal costs in each 
agency’s territory.46 The cartel limited competition between the four and made new 
entry difficult, because a new entrant needed a global organization from day one, 
since no existing news agency would be willing to offer a contract for part of the 
world: The big four internationals had bound themselves in a cartel, and national 
news organizations generally had exclusive contracts with one of the cartel 
partners.47 The global news cartel and its exclusive contracts with national 
counterparts thus mitigated both the excludability and the nondiminishability 
problem. 
Although here we focus on international exclusion through collusion, at the 
national level exclusion was sometimes also important. In the United States, for 
example, the NYAP had exclusive members at the local level that could deny access 
to other members, allowing NYAP members to capture monopoly revenues. In 1880, 
for example, it served only 355 of the 971 U.S. daily newspapers.48 It also required 
members to supply their news exclusively to the pool and had an advantageous 
agreement with the major U.S. telegraph company Western Union giving it 
preferential access and low rates.49 In Britain, on the contrary, the Press Association, 
                                            
46 The absence of strong international antitrust laws, making collusion go unpunished, and probably governments’ reluctance to 
let their news agencies merge, prevented merger or acquisition as a mechanism that would allow coordination inside one firm. 
Yet Reuters and Havas did form a joint service to South America, and Reuters, Havas and Wolff formed a joint venture to 
provide a news photo service. Silberstein-Loeb, “News markets.” 
47 But note that cartel partners remained in competition in areas outside of an agreement. See, for example, Reuters business 
in Germany until 1898, in Rantanen, News, pp. 97–99. 
48 John, Network Nation, p. 146. The American Press Association was a news trader formed by newspapers excluded from the 
NYAP. Ibid., p. 147. 
49 Western Union probably hoped that this helped keep Congress from regulation the telegraph. Contracts stipulated that NYAP 
and its newspapers could not write unfavourably about Western Union. See John, Network Nation. 
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which consisted of mainly provincial newspapers, and had a contract with Reuters, 
let every newspaper in.50 
 
 
Crises: the ups and downs of news provision 
An important aspect of the news that news agencies traded, was the random 
appearance of calamities such as earthquakes, floods, wars, and political, economic 
and financial crises. Already during the Dutch tulip speculative boom and bust in the 
1630s, well-developed print media disseminated information about the tulip mania as 
it happened.51 Arrow’s paradox discussed above implied that agencies could not 
easily ask a higher price at the moment a crisis appeared, even though their 
reporting costs were likely to go up.  
Although marginal news distribution costs were extremely low, the marginal 
costs of news gathering were not minimal. Correspondents, reporters, and stringers 
were largely fixed costs, because often, depending on their contract, they needed to 
be paid whether there were many potential news events or not. On the other hand, 
eventful years with large quantities of potential news events could increase costs 
substantially, as more reporters and correspondents would be hired and sent away, 
and more telegraph line capacity needed to be rented.  
The historical accounts of the Associated Press indeed suggest that wars led 
to increased expenditure. The cost of its foreign service shot up in 1898 during the 
Spanish-American War from 9 percent of all expenditure to 22 percent, reflecting a 
tripling of the dollar amount spent on foreign news.52 It happened again at the 
                                            
50 Silberstein-Loeb, “News market in Britain.” 
51 Robert J. Shiller, Irrational exuberance (New York, Broadway Books, revised version of the Second Edition, 2009), p. 85, 
248; see also Peter M. Garber, Famous first bubbles: the fundamentals of early manias (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2000). 
52 Schwarzlose, Wire Services. 
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outbreak of World War I, when foreign service expenditure increased from 8 percent 
in 1913 to 14 percent in 1914, 16 percent in 1915, reaching 20 percent in 1918, the 
latter being more than double the 1913 dollar amount in real terms.53 
There are several ways in which news agencies were still able to make sure 
they could make at least enough money from crisis news to cover their costs. One 
way was that in the subscription system, the annual subscription fee could reflect the 
reputation of the news agency, and the expectation that when crises happened, raw 
news would be delivered fast and effectively to the customer. The subscription in this 
way had somewhat of an insurance character: most of the time the subscription may 
not have been that essential, but the customer knew that in the times that mattered, 
when newspaper sales for example could boom because of crises news, the 
customer would get the raw news at least as fast as competitors, if not faster. 
Reuters emphasized this insurance aspect of subscription. The firm used to say that 
the boring years paid for the exciting years, because in exciting years costs would be 
higher while the subscriber base would not significantly change.  
 Another possibility was to charge a premium for crisis newsnot for the first 
news of the impending crisis, but for the whole package of crisis news once it had 
started. This was difficult in practice, however, as customer contracts needed to be 
renegotiated then, and it could not always be foreseen when exactly a crisis would 
start and what could be defined as a crisis. In situations where definitions could be 
made easily and unambiguously, this was sometimes done. In the British market, for 
example, Reuters was able to levy a 50 percent war surcharge on London 
                                            
53 At the same time, real revenue decreased during the war, 20 percent in total between 1914 and 1918, and most of it—16 
percent—when the United States entered the war. Ibid., p. 251. 
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newspapers’ subscription fee from 1885. The charge would last from one month after 
outbreak of war to one month after cessation of hostilities.54  
Yet even with the war surcharge Reuters did not always succeed in making 
sufficient profits. In 1918, for example, its profit margin was just 2.1 percent, about 
one third of what it had been in 1908.55 The Associated Press’ profit margin appears 
to have been lower most times and was probably not that dissimilar to the margins of 
its predecessor, the Western Associated Press, between 1867 and 1890. As both 
American organizations were cooperatives, low dues for members-cum-customers 
rather than profit maximization was the objective. Nevertheless, profit margins gave 
some indication of the viability of the business.  
Increasing expenditure on news-gathering would not necessarily lead to larger 
revenues. In the long run it may have added a few subscribers, but once large 
agencies such as Reuters had subscribed nearly all potential customers, marginal 
expenditures on news gathering hardly resulted in marginal revenues. First of all, 
some agencies did not own the papers, so profits from increased circulation because 
of better news gathering went largely to newspapers. Yet, in the long run, 
independently owned agencies could extract part of these increased rents by 
increasing subscription fees, such as Reuters’s war surcharge, whereas news 
cooperatives such as the Associated Press, where newspapers owned the news 
agency, internalized this incentive problem.56 It might not be a coincidence that the 
Associated Press had a lower profit margin than Reuters because it had a bigger 
incentive to spend more on increasing quality: The Associated Press’s owners also 
                                            
54 Silberstein-Loeb, ‘News Market’, p. 778. 
55 Reuters was restructured and reorganised during the war, with government support, among other things abandoning its 
disastrous foray into banking. Read, Reuters, pp. 83, 153, 111–31; Silberstein-Loeb, “Market for News.” Using additional data 
to Read, Silberstein-Loeb also shows that gross margins had roughly halved between the 1860s and the 1880s, after which 
they fluctuated in a relatively stable band until World War I. Ibid., p. 777. 
56 The NYAP (c. 1846–1893), was organized as a partnership. The present-day Associated Press is the successor of the 
Western Associated Press, a rival to NYAP. On transaction costs and vertical integration see Williamson, Economic Institutions. 
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were its customers and thus would capture more of the increased marginal revenues 
driven by the increased quality than Reuters could. 57 The latter’s merger with the 
Press Association may have been a logical step to align the incentives.58 
Second, increased expenditure on news gathering did not generally lead to 
more potential news events happening, especially the “hard” events such as murders 
or wars, although if increased reporting shortened the feedback cycle, it could lead to 
some more news per unit of time.59 At the same time, more potential news events 
happening, especially the hard events, did lead to more expenditure.60 Increased 
expenditure could increase quality by transforming more of the lesser potential news 
events into news and by boosting variety through the offering of more human interest 
reports or by adding new news categories, such as sports, arts, or science.61 
Reuters, for example, set up a supplementary foreign service in 1890 that focused 
more on human interest, features, and background stories to supplement the hard 
news. It was jointly funded by Reuters and the Press Association, the latter sharing 
in the costs and thus reducing Reuter’s profit fluctuations.62 
Besides  vertical integration with the customers, war surcharges, and a 
subscription fee high enough to cover unforeseen crisis reporting, , there appear to 
have been few other means by which news agencies were able to recover higher 
reporting costs during crises. During wars governments alleviated some of the costs 
by providing items such as transport, protection, food and lodging in natura. During 
                                            
57 Obviously, many other factors were likely to have contributed to the difference in profit margins. The importance of the ability 
to capture marginal revenues for media organizations is further explored in Bakker, “Music Multinational”, and in Bakker, 
‘Rights-Based Model”. Williamson, Economic Institutions, and Roberts, The Modern Firm provide theories to explain why 
activities are done within or without an organization. 
58 See “Organisational structure of the international news agencies.” 
59 One could argue that a potential news event became news once it was reported. If it went unreported and unrecorded, 
obviously it was not transformed into news. For a general discussion of the nature of news see Robert E. Park, “News as a 
form of knowledge: a chapter in the sociology of knowledge,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 45 No. 5 (March 1940), pp. 
669–86. 
60 We abstract here from the secular acceleration in news events per time interval through increasing uniformity and decreasing 
response times brought about by the telegraph. See the next section. 
61 See above. 
62 Silberstein-Loeb, “News market in Britain,” p. 779. 
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financial crises, more firms might want to have a real time subscription to raw 
business news, but at the same time some customers went bankrupt. Likewise, 
many newspaper customers experienced lower advertising revenues and thus had a 
lower willingness to pay. In the Netherlands, for example, the crisis of the 1930s 
forced the existing news agencies into one merged organisation, a national exclusive 
cooperative with most newspapers in the country as members. 
All the business data discussed above and tabulated in Diagram 4 obtained 
extra relevance during crises. Present-day studies in finance generally find that news 
affect the movement of financial markets. The size of the effect that studies find 
differs substantially. It also remains the question to what extent media reporting 
produces feedback effects, or self-reinforcing herd behaviour. Some authors, such 
as Robert Shiller, argue that there is a substantial effect of the media in instigating 
bubbles, while other authors find the obverse.63 Campbell, Turner and Walker, for 
example, find that press coverage did not feed the British railway mania in the 
1840s, and Battacharya et al., find that media reporting played only a very limited 
role in the internet bubble of the 1990s.64 
During financial crises, everyone wanted to know the latest information about 
goods prices, quantities, exchange rates, credit rating, interest rates, share prices, 
election results, and battle outcomes, as well as the results of opinion surveys such 
as those on consumer and business confidence. Longitudinal studies for the 
twentieth century show that during crises, the financial markets were far more 
sensitive to media reports, both reports containing new information and more 
                                            
63 Shiller, Irrational exuberance, pp. 85-105. 
64 Gareth Campbell, John D. Turner and Clive B. Walker, “The role of the media in a bubble,” Explorations in Economic History, 
Vol. 49 (2012), pp. 461-481; Utpal Bhattacharya, Neal Galpin, Rina Ray and Xiaoyun Yu,“The Role of the Media in the 
Internet IPO Bubble,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 44, No. 3, June 2009, pp. 657–682. 
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‘persuasive’ reports that served only to increase exposure of a particular stock.65 
This suggests that customers, especially corporate customers, may also have had a 
higher willingness to pay during crises. 
Yet the news agencies had little ability to transform this willingness to pay into 
higher revenues. In theory, they could increase the subscription fee for corporate 
subscriptions during crises, but in practice this was often not feasible. The 
infrastructure companies, such as the telegraph and telephone companies, probably 
made more money from financial crises, wars, and other calamities.66 Especially in 
the late nineteenth century when telegraph capacity was quite scarce, news 
agencies spent far more on leasing costs during crises. 
The raw material that the news agencies transformed into sellable news 
bulletins was not the news, but the entire universe of all events that happened at a 
given time. The news agencies selected the events they judged as news, and then 
they further added value by writing accurate reports about these events and 
combining various disparate facts into one coherent report. So the selection of what 
was news could be compared to gold mining: sifting through an enormous amount of 
rubbish and then keeping the few gold nuggets. The writing of reports was then 
combining some gold nuggets, reporting accurately on them and as fast as one 
could, and then selling them to customers across in the world. In short, subscribers 
paid news agencies for various quality dimensions: judgement, selection, accurate 
reports, speed, coherent reports, and unbiased reports. During crises most of these 
quality dimensions became more relevant. 
                                            
65 Paul C. Tetlock, “Giving content to investor sentiment: the role of media in the stock market,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 62 
(2007), pp. 1139-1168; Diego Garcia, “Sentiment during recessions,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 68 No. 3 (June 2013), pp. 1267-
1300. Joseph E. Engelberg and Christopher A. Parsons, “The Causal Impact of Media in Financial Markets,” Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 66 No. 1 (February 2011), pp. 67-97, examining regional news find also that stock price movements are very 
sensitive to the reporting and publishing of new information. 
66 Dwayne Winseck, “Double-edged swords: communications media and the global financial crisis of 1873,” in: Peter Putnis, 
Chandrika Kaul and Juergen Wilke eds., Communication, News and Globlisation: Historical Studies (Hampton Press / 
International Association of Media and Communication Research, 2011), pp. 55-82. 
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As calamities unfolded surprising events happened in rapid succession. After 
a financial crisis broke, the key thing people started to expect was the unexpected. 
They became habituated to surprising events that continued to happen and stopped 
trusting other expectations. Keynes already noted this in his General Theory when 
he discussed animal spirits: once a crisis was in progress, businessmen expected so 
many surprises that they held back investments, and were not prepared to make the 
jump into uncertainty they normally made when they green-lighted new investments. 
The only thing they felt sure about was that surprising things would continue to 
happen.67 
Crises can be divided into various different crises: natural disasters such as 
earth quakes or floods; financial and economic crises; wars; famines (Diagram 6). Of 
these calamities, wars and natural disasters were probably the most costly to report, 
since reporters needed to be at far-away and often dangerous locations. Telegraph 
lines needed to be leased, travel tickets booked and additional correspondents hired. 
The cases of Reuters and AP discussed above show that these cost increases were 
large and significant. Financial crises, on the contrary, happened usually in known 
places such as financial and political capitals, where reporters and a whole reporting 
infrastructure were already present, making these crises far easier and less costly to 
report. Business customers’ willingness to pay might have been exceptionally high 
for financial news. What they actually needed to pay was probably exceptionally low 
in comparison. 
It appears that the willingness of customers to pay might also have been high 
in the case of political crises,  partially because the outcome of political crises could  
  
                                            
67 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007; orig. edn. 
1936). 
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Diagram 6. Informal overview of cost and quality dimensions of news reporting in several types of 
crisis situations. 
       Reporting aspect Natural disasters 
and accidents 
Famines Wars Financial 
and 
economic 
crises 
Political 
crises 
Elections 
       Reporting costs 
  
  
 
High 
 
 
 
Intermediate High Low Low Intermediate 
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Source: informal judgement based on the historical literature discussed in this paper. 
 
have a big effect on the business and financial world. In terms of duration, financial 
crises lasted longer than many other crises. 
The value of speed and accuracy was probably highest in wars, financial 
crises and political crises (Diagram 6). The consequences of reporting errors were 
probably most serious in wars, financial crises, and in electionsthe latter partially 
because of self-feedback mechanisms. In addition, salaries for war correspondents 
and financial journalists were probably among the highest for news journalists. 
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In the long run, news providers made money from crises and from financial 
crises in particular because the possibility of crises meant that many customers kept 
subscribing to the service at substantial fees in quiet times. And individual crises 
might eventually lead to more circulation and therefore higher advertising rates for 
customers. If crises knocked out a few smaller media firms then the survivors could 
profit. If competition declined, they could transform some of the consumer surplus 
into corporate profits. During severe economic crises in which many newspaper shut 
down or merge, the iconic outlets that survived might have got into better shape 
because customers flocked to the old trusted names and some competitors had 
disappeared. 
 
 
New business models  
One way in which news providers were not able to capture the benefit or the rents of 
the services they provided, was through the analysis of large databanks full of news 
articles by hedge funds and other financial firms. Academics studies abound about 
relations between news reporting and movements in the market, and undoubtedly 
many financial firms do their own research using large news databanks. They can 
test relations between news pieces and the movements of the financial market, at 
macro, meso, and micro levels. Though news providers get some money from the 
use of databanks, it remains a question whether they just get a very small part of the 
rents / profits that others generate from the large aggregate of the information that 
they create.  
Iconic news providers such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, 
the Financial Times, Reuters, AP and AFP would each on their be able to thwart a 
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data-mining exercise by withholding their content, and so in theory should be able to 
capture some of the rents of the data-mining exercise. In practice, however, if 
individual subscriber has access to a publication’s entire archive, this will be difficult. 
If they would ever be able to capture some of the profits that others generate from 
their information, the iconic providers at least could make big money.   
Maybe it is news providers’ curse they can make so little money from crises. 
Their customers, especially the corporate customers such as investment banks and 
hedge funds can make large profits with the reliable teal-time data, and with massive 
number crunching on the universe of all past news stories, yet it seems that the 
news providers themselves have very little means to capture a lot of the rents that 
those customers are generating.  
In the nineteenth century, when, besides merchants, firms, trading exchanges 
and government departments, the major customers were newspapers, many news 
agencies solved this problem by vertical integration. However, it is difficult to see 
whether and how the vertical integration of financial news with investment banks and 
hedge funds could work. Presumably if we use the AP model, this would involve 
banks becoming members of a news cooperative and so paying for the news, but at 
the same time they would also be major subjects in the news that the agency would 
provide, thus creating a conflict of interest. A long similar lines of reasoning it seems 
unwise to have financial firms owning news agencies. 
The only chance of rent capture may be to charge special access fees for 
database access and limit it to per-calculation access, in which the customer does 
not get copies of the news stories database, but can only send in an algorithm that 
the news organisation will run for them on the news database, which they keep in-
house. Access fees for social scientists and governments, could also be levied, and 
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this is already happening to some extent. Yet, since the latter activities may not 
generate a lot of profit, there may not be a lot of rent to be captured here. What kind 
of business model the news agencies will come up with next is an inspiring question 
that makes one look full of wonder and excitement to the times that lie before us. 
The answer will define the role of news in the other financial crises in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper examined how we got to a situation where a few firms dominated the 
international market for raw news, why within countries national news supplies were 
dominated by a few firms, how these agencies have been able to make money from 
news, and what business models they developed to this end. We also examined how 
these business models interacted with market structure, and if and how the business 
models held their ground during the ups and downs of news supply, such as financial 
crises and other calamities. 
 We gave a brief overview of the news trade since the Renaissance and noted 
how four general economic tendencies that affect the evolution of media industries 
affected the evolution of news networks: how sunk costs led to a quality race, 
leading to a handful of news agencies dominating the international news trade after 
the 1850s; how the fact that marginal revenues equalled marginal profits stimulated 
vertical integration, as, for example, expressed in the many news cooperatives 
across the world and the Press Association’s acquisition of Reuters; how the toll 
good character of news led to business models focused on ways to exclude 
customers so a fee could be asked; and, finally, how the project-based character of 
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news gathering led to agglomeration and co-location of news traders with other 
media industries.  
 The key problem news traders faced was how to overcome Arrow’s 
fundamental paradox. To sell news, they needed to reveal the content, and when 
they revealed the content they had already given it away. We reviewed the solutions 
that firms devised for this, which involved business models focused on trading the 
quantitative values of economic properties that could be stated in advance such as 
prices, quantities, exchange rates and interest rates; on subscriptions, through which 
the marginal price of a news item to the buyer became zero; on bundling of news 
items; on speed; on exclusive territorial contracts; on deterring entry by forming a 
news cartel; and, finally, on inviting money from firms about which reports were 
written, as happened in France during the nineteenth century. 
 Given the fundamental paradox, it was difficult for news agencies to profit 
from crises. They could not ask higher prices for individual news items during a 
crises, and the possibilities for raising subscription fees or increasing the number of 
subscriptions were limited. Yet financial crises were what probably made a large part 
of business customers willing to pay the subscription fees, knowing that even if the 
service’s value was lower than the fee during good times, during crises its value 
would be enormous. 
 We also noted how nowadays news agencies only to a very limited extent can 
capture some of the revenue that firms like banks and hedge funds extract from 
large databanks of historical news messages. The development of any business 
models that would allow news agencies to capture more of this revenue might have 
profound implications for the financial viability of news agencies. 
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 In their quest to be able to ask money for news, news agencies developed 
models that made them less sensitive to crises, less sensitive to selling any 
individual piece of news, and therefore made their business models more crisis-
resistant. The flip side was that because of these same models they could not easily 
make money from crisis news by selling at higher prices, and many crises, such as 
wars and natural disasters, actually cost them much more to report. Financial crises 
were less costly to report than most other calamities. Relative to other crises, the 
news agencies probably lost less money on financial crises in the short run. In the 
long run, crises formed their lifeblood. They may not have been able to make 
particular moneys from particular crises, but they existed because crises happened. 
No crises, no news agencies. 
 News agencies may not have been able to make particular moneys from 
particular calamities, but in the long run the crises justified the existence of the 
agencies to the customers. No crises, no news agencies. When frequent financial 
crises started to become a trademark for the emerging world economy, the news 
agencies helped to report them, and helped to link crises in particular countries to 
the rest of the world. In this way news agencies shaped the emergence of the 
modern world economy as we know it today. 
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